Topic · Authentication
DMARC p=reject policy
A DMARC p=reject policy requests receivers to reject mail that fails aligned SPF or DKIM checks for the protected From domain.
How it works
Receivers apply their own policy and trust evaluations, but reject is the strongest published DMARC disposition request.
What can go wrong
Misaligned production senders may experience hard delivery failures when the receiving system enforces the policy.
What to check or do
Verify known senders, preserve report monitoring and test vendors and forwarders before moving to reject.
How to investigate DMARC p=reject policy
- Signal to investigate
- SMTP rejects affect a legitimate application after p=reject deployment.
- Evidence to collect
- Capture the SMTP rejection, aligned identifiers on rejected messages if available, and aggregate reporting for the affected source.
- Common wrong conclusion
- A syntactically valid reject policy does not establish that every legitimate mail flow is correctly authenticated.
How to interpret the evidence
Receivers make local handling decisions, and messages from forwarding systems may fail SPF while preserving DKIM. Treat enforcement failures as an inventory or alignment investigation, not a reason to disable all authentication.
What to change and how to verify it
Fix aligned DKIM or branded return-path for the affected stream; retest actual messages before re-enabling or escalating enforcement.
Put this into practice
Run a focused check, then explore protection if your domain needs it.