Topic · Authentication
DMARC
Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance tells receiving servers how to handle mail that fails aligned SPF or DKIM.
How it works
A DNS TXT record at _dmarc announces policy and report destinations; RFC 9989 specifies DNS tree-walk policy discovery and alignment evaluation for the visible author domain.
What can go wrong
A domain can pass SPF for a vendor yet still fail DMARC when the visible From domain is not aligned.
What to check or do
Inventory actual senders and interpret current DMARC aggregate reports; choose enforcement settings based on the domain’s usage, compatibility needs and RFC 9989 guidance rather than assuming reject is suitable for every general-purpose domain.
Practical scenario
A SaaS company sends receipts through a billing platform and newsletters through a separate marketing provider. Both vendors report SPF pass, but the messages still show DMARC fail because neither the SMTP envelope domain nor the DKIM signer matches the company’s From domain. Adding more SPF entries to the root domain alone does not repair that alignment.
Verification checklist
- Inspect a fresh message from every service in the actual destination inbox.
- Compare Header From with DKIM d= and SMTP MAIL FROM domains.
- Review rua aggregate reports by source IP and organizational owner.
- Move toward quarantine or reject only once critical streams consistently align.
How to investigate DMARC
- Signal to investigate
- A message may show SPF pass and DKIM pass but still fail DMARC; compare the domains involved, not just the pass flags.
- Evidence to collect
- In a real delivered header, at least one passing SPF MAIL FROM or DKIM d= identity aligns with Header From, according to the published alignment policy.
- Common wrong conclusion
- A policy of p=reject is not proof every legitimate sender will pass; inventory forwarders and third-party services first.
How to interpret the evidence
Build a small matrix for each sending service: displayed From, SMTP MAIL FROM, SPF result, DKIM d=, DKIM result and DMARC disposition. A single message can have two authentication passes that both belong to unrelated domains; neither meets DMARC's identifier-alignment requirement. Look at the complete set of messages, not a vendor screenshot reporting only SPF success.
What to change and how to verify it
Fix alignment at the actual originating service: configure its custom return-path domain or aligned DKIM signing identity. Repeat the same test for password resets, billing and campaigns. Use aggregate report trends as supporting evidence, and change policy only after known legitimate streams are safe.
dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.comEducational example; not validated against your live infrastructure._dmarc.example.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]"Put this into practice
Run a focused check, then explore protection if your domain needs it.