Topic · Authentication

DMARC

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance tells receiving servers how to handle mail that fails aligned SPF or DKIM.

Email Security Glossary·Practical guidance
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01 / How it works

How it works

A DNS TXT record at _dmarc announces policy and report destinations; RFC 9989 specifies DNS tree-walk policy discovery and alignment evaluation for the visible author domain.

02 / What can go wrong

What can go wrong

A domain can pass SPF for a vendor yet still fail DMARC when the visible From domain is not aligned.

03 / What to check or do

What to check or do

Inventory actual senders and interpret current DMARC aggregate reports; choose enforcement settings based on the domain’s usage, compatibility needs and RFC 9989 guidance rather than assuming reject is suitable for every general-purpose domain.

Practical scenario

Practical scenario

A SaaS company sends receipts through a billing platform and newsletters through a separate marketing provider. Both vendors report SPF pass, but the messages still show DMARC fail because neither the SMTP envelope domain nor the DKIM signer matches the company’s From domain. Adding more SPF entries to the root domain alone does not repair that alignment.

Verification checklist

  1. Inspect a fresh message from every service in the actual destination inbox.
  2. Compare Header From with DKIM d= and SMTP MAIL FROM domains.
  3. Review rua aggregate reports by source IP and organizational owner.
  4. Move toward quarantine or reject only once critical streams consistently align.
Practical diagnosis

How to investigate DMARC

Signal to investigate
A message may show SPF pass and DKIM pass but still fail DMARC; compare the domains involved, not just the pass flags.
Evidence to collect
In a real delivered header, at least one passing SPF MAIL FROM or DKIM d= identity aligns with Header From, according to the published alignment policy.
Common wrong conclusion
A policy of p=reject is not proof every legitimate sender will pass; inventory forwarders and third-party services first.

How to interpret the evidence

Build a small matrix for each sending service: displayed From, SMTP MAIL FROM, SPF result, DKIM d=, DKIM result and DMARC disposition. A single message can have two authentication passes that both belong to unrelated domains; neither meets DMARC's identifier-alignment requirement. Look at the complete set of messages, not a vendor screenshot reporting only SPF success.

What to change and how to verify it

Fix alignment at the actual originating service: configure its custom return-path domain or aligned DKIM signing identity. Repeat the same test for password resets, billing and campaigns. Use aggregate report trends as supporting evidence, and change policy only after known legitimate streams are safe.

Illustrative diagnostic — substitute your authorized domain or host
dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com
Educational example; not validated against your live infrastructure.
Illustrative example — do not copy directly to production
_dmarc.example.com TXT "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]"
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Put this into practice

Run a focused check, then explore protection if your domain needs it.

Authoritative reference ↗