Topic · Transport Security
TLS downgrade attack
A TLS downgrade attack interferes with security negotiation to force weaker or unencrypted transport.
How it works
Attackers may attempt to strip STARTTLS capability from opportunistic SMTP sessions.
What can go wrong
Opportunistic TLS alone may not prevent active downgrades. An attacker can interfere with an unauthenticated STARTTLS offer.
What to check or do
Use enforced MTA-STS or DANE where applicable and monitor TLS-RPT. Use authenticated policies and compare real delivery traces.
How to investigate TLS downgrade attack
- Signal to investigate
- SMTP sessions unexpectedly fall back to plaintext on a path that previously supported STARTTLS.
- Evidence to collect
- Inspect SMTP traces, STARTTLS advertisements, DNS policy discovery and available TLS-RPT failure information.
- Common wrong conclusion
- One plaintext hop does not by itself prove an active attacker; misconfiguration and transient network faults can look similar.
How to interpret the evidence
Without a strict transport policy, opportunistic SMTP encryption may permit delivery without TLS. An active downgrade is a separate hypothesis that requires supporting path evidence.
What to change and how to verify it
Deploy and validate MTA-STS or DANE where supported, examine relay logs, and monitor policy failures rather than disabling TLS validation.
Put this into practice
Run a focused check, then explore protection if your domain needs it.