Topic · Transport Security
STARTTLS
STARTTLS upgrades a plaintext SMTP connection to an encrypted TLS session when both servers support it.
How it works
An SMTP client discovers STARTTLS after EHLO and negotiates a TLS handshake.
What can go wrong
Opportunistic STARTTLS can be subject to downgrade attacks without an enforcing policy.
What to check or do
Check live SMTP negotiation, certificate identity and policy enforcement.
Practical scenario
A security scan finds STARTTLS on one mail exchanger, but another advertised MX has no STARTTLS capability. Since senders can select any eligible MX, checking one host is insufficient to assess the domain’s transport configuration.
Verification checklist
- Resolve all MX records and their current IPv4/IPv6 targets.
- Probe the SMTP greeting, EHLO and STARTTLS negotiation on port 25.
- Inspect the presented certificate and negotiated protocol details.
- Review MTA-STS or DANE as the enforcement layer rather than equating STARTTLS availability with protection.
How to investigate STARTTLS
- Signal to investigate
- A relay advertises STARTTLS in one environment but not on the public SMTP listener.
- Evidence to collect
- Connect to port 25, issue EHLO and confirm STARTTLS advertisement and a valid handshake.
- Common wrong conclusion
- Successful TCP 25 connection is not proof that transport encryption is available.
How to interpret the evidence
SMTP STARTTLS upgrades a plaintext SMTP session after the server advertises the extension in EHLO. Merely connecting to port 25 or receiving a banner does not show that the upgrade is present or that a valid TLS session succeeds. A middlebox can also interfere with advertisement or negotiation.
What to change and how to verify it
Test the public MX from outside the hosting network, record the EHLO features and handshake outcome, and evaluate certificates separately. If strict MTA-STS or DANE is in scope, verify those policies too; opportunistic encryption alone does not provide the same guarantees.
openssl s_client -starttls smtp -connect mx.example.com:25 -servername mx.example.com -briefEducational example; not validated against your live infrastructure.EHLO mail.example.com\n250-STARTTLSPut this into practice
Run a focused check, then explore protection if your domain needs it.